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No More Excuses
A CASE FOR THE IRS’S FULL COMPLIANCE WITH
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is the only federal
agency in the United States that has the legal right to take
your money first, and then defend its right to the appropriation
later.1 The power of the IRS is tremendous. However, it is also
the agency whose laws are the hardest to challenge because of
its countless, ever-changing rules, regulations, and
pronouncements.2 It is no wonder that the public has such
disdain for the IRS.3
This is unfortunate. The IRS serves the most
fundamental role in America’s democratic system of
government—collection of revenue through taxation.4 Without
it, there would be no government.5 Funds collected through
taxation, for instance, are used to finance the various federal
agencies of the executive branch and their projects.6 Therefore,
1

See 26 U.S.C. § 6331 (2006); see also Brian v. Gugin, 853 F. Supp. 358, 361
(D. Idaho 1994).
2
See Chris Edwards, Income Tax Rife with Complexity and Inefficiency, CATO
INST. TAX & BUDGET BULL. (Apr. 2006), http://www.cato.org/pubs/tbb/tbb-0604-33.pdf.
3
Kevin Boully, Take Advantage of Public Opinion: The SEC Is the Lowest Rated
Agency, LITIG. POSTSCRIPT (May 20, 2009), http://www.litigationps.com/litigation_postscript_
per/2009/05/take-advantage-of-public-opinion-the-sec-is-the-lowest-rated-agency.html
(although the SEC was the lowest-rated agency following various scandals and
oversights, the IRS came in at a close second and was cited as “the always-hated
Internal Revenue Service”).
4
See Fact Sheet on Writing & Enacting Tax Legislation, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, http://www.ustreas.gov/education/fact-sheets/taxes/writing.shtml (last visited
Jan. 14, 2010).
5
Some might argue, as critics of big government do, that this is a good thing.
But realistically speaking, we need some form of centralized government to ensure order
and security. We agree to taxation in return for representation. Recall the famous outcry,
“No taxation without representation.” Britain, America, and the 1765 Stamp Act: An
Exhibition by the Parliamentary Archives, U. K. PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.
uk/parliamentary_publications_and_archives/parliamentary_archives/archives___stamp_
act.cfm (last visited Jan. 14, 2010).
6
The largest amount of tax revenue is allocated to the Department of Health
and Human Services, Social Security Administration, Department of Defense—Military,
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it is important for citizens to trust the IRS and cooperate in
helping it execute this important role.
But how can the government accomplish this goal when
people have disliked the IRS for so long? The answer is
transparency
and
accountability—particularly
through
adherence to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).7 The
root of the problem appears to be the unbridled power of the
IRS.8 People fear and dislike the IRS because they feel
powerless against it. In Cohen v. United States,9 the majority
even joked, “A fool and his money are soon parted. It takes
creative tax laws for the rest,”10 and applied the quote to the
IRS’s “aggressive interpretation of the tax code.”11
Congress’s power of taxation is remarkable. The Sixteenth
Amendment gives Congress the “power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several states, and without regard to any census or
enumeration.”12 Additionally, the definition of “income” has been
interpreted expansively: “Gross income means all income from
whatever source derived, unless excluded by law . . . [and]
includes income realized in any form, whether in money,
property, or services.”13 Then, adding on to that broad taxing
power, the Treasury interprets the tax laws with great flexibility,
including issuing binding regulations without adhering to formal
rulemaking procedures pursuant to the APA.14
and Department of the Treasury. See A. Moore & A. Moah, The Tax Breakdown Project
2008, TAXBREAKDOWN.ORG, http://www.taxbreakdown.org (last visited July 11, 2010).
7
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000 & Supp.
IV 2004).
8
See generally Byron York, Health Care Reform Means More Power for the
IRS, THE WASH. EXAMINER, Sept. 2, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonexaminer.
com/politics/Health-care-reform-means-more-power-for-the-IRS-56781377.html (“Under
the Democrats’ health care proposals, the already powerful—and already feared—IRS
would wield even more power and extend its reach even farther into the lives of ordinary
Americans . . . .”).
9
578 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also infra Part III.A.
10
Cohen, 578 F.3d at 3 (quoting comic strip writer Bob Thaves) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
11
See id.
12
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
13
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1954); see also Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331,
334 (1940); Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 U.S. 216, 223 (1937);
Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 9 (1935); Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 166 (1925);
Cesarini v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 3, 5 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (explaining that the U.S.
Supreme Court has “frequently stated that this broad all-inclusive language was used
by Congress to exert the full measure of its taxing power under the Sixteenth
Amendment”) (citing Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955)).
14
See infra Part III.B. The IRS publishes official documents that help
taxpayers apply the law to their unique situations. These documents include revenue
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However, if a taxpayer wants to challenge the IRS’s
appropriation of his or her funds and seek a refund, that
taxpayer must pass myriad procedural hurdles, including
forms and deadlines.15 And if the case winds up in litigation, it
is the agency’s own interpretations found in Treasury
regulations and revenue rulings and procedures that are
provided as precedent,16 thereby lessening the chances of a
refund even more. Thus, the IRS has the power to affect
taxpayers’ rights and obligations almost freely and at the same
time restrict their access to a remedy.
This result goes against all notions of fairness and due
process. Separation of powers is one of the most fundamental
principles of our democratic system of government—it protects
citizens against the accumulation of too much power in any one
branch of government.17 However, when you have an
independent agency like the IRS that has power to pass
binding law and adjudicate matters in its own right, and whose
members are secure in their jobs with no need to please the
public in order to remain there,18 the potential for abuse is skyhigh and the need for regulation is imperative. However, as
will be discussed, the IRS has failed to comply with the
regulatory scheme that Congress established to monitor
administrative actions.19 This raised some concern in the past,
but it was not until recently, when the D.C. Circuit decided
Cohen v. United States, that the IRS’s lack of full compliance
with the APA became even more problematic.20
rulings, revenue procedures, and notices. The Commissioner of the IRS also proposes
regulations to the Treasury, which must get its approval before assuming the force of
law. There are three types of Treasury regulations: proposed, temporary, or final. Only
final and temporary regulations are binding as law, although temporary regulations
expire after three years. Proposed regulations are not binding authority. 26 U.S.C.
§ 7805(e) (2006); Internal Revenue Bulletins, Guide to Understanding the Differences
Among Official IRS Documents, UNCLEFED.COM, http://www.unclefed.com/Tax-Bulls/
OfficialDocsExp.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2010); see also Internal Revenue Serv.,
Understanding IRS Guidance—A Brief Primer, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/
0,,id=101102,00.html (last updated Nov. 7, 2003).
15
See Internal Revenue Serv., Collection Appeal Rights, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1660.pdf (last updated Mar. 4, 2010).
16
See Internal Revenue Serv., Tax Code, Regulations, and Official Guidance,
IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/taxpros/article/0,,id=98137,00.html (last updated Nov. 12,
2010) (“Rulings and procedures reported in the [Internal Revenue Bulletins] do not have
the force and effect of Treasury tax regulations, but they may be used as precedents.”).
17
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
18
See KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
68 (4th ed. 2004).
19
See infra Part III.B.
20
See infra Part III.A.
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This note will discuss Cohen v. United States, as well as
other factors and developments that support the case for the
IRS’s full compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act.
Part I of this note describes the APA, its purpose, and some
relevant provisions. Part II discusses the IRS, its rulemaking
procedures, and its lack of compliance with the APA. Part III
discusses the various reasons why it is in the IRS’s best
interests to comply with the APA: (a) Cohen v. United States
might have opened the door for greater judicial review of IRS
rulemaking, increasing the chances of a rule being invalidated;
(b) compliance will help ensure deference in court proceedings,
thereby saving the IRS the time and money it would have to
spend defending reasons for a rule’s receiving deference from
the courts; (c) it supports the IRS’s mission to focus on the
taxpayers and will thus help the IRS meet its tax gap reduction
goals in an efficient way; and (d) it upholds the integrity of the
rule of law by supporting a democratic legislative process,
thereby protecting taxpayer interests and increasing their
confidence in the system. Part IV concludes the note by
recognizing that, although it is not certain that courts will
expand their judicial review of IRS rulemaking, it is clear that
there are many other factors supporting the case for the IRS’s
full compliance with the APA.
I.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

The administrative state was not born with the creation
of American government. In fact, America actually opposed the
“gradual development of a more concentrated, specialized, and
penetrating state apparatus in Britain”21—some even believing
that this was one cause of the American Revolution.22 Instead,
the administrative state developed over time;23 and while there
are differing interpretations of the development process,24 it can
be agreed that the administrative state evolved in response to
“the growing need for vesting in a public authority supervision

21

STEVEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION
reprinted in PETER H.

OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982),
SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 33 (1994).
22

Id.
SCHUCK, supra note 21, at 31.
24
See, e.g., GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963);
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900 (1982); James
Q. Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, 41 PUB. INT. 77 (1975).
23
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over the economic integrity of industries.”25 It was likewise a
way to fill the gaps made by the deficiencies of the judiciary
and the legislature.26
However, with the expansion of administrative agencies
came criticism and calls for regulation,27 as such agencies had
the potential to infringe on fundamental due process rights.28
The Administrative Procedure Act was the government’s
answer to such concerns.29 This section will explain the purpose
of the Administrative Procedure Act and set out its relevant
provisions as they relate to the IRS’s rulemaking authority.
A.

Purpose of the Administrative Procedure Act

The Administrative Procedure Act was enacted in 1946
to promote “fair play and equal rights under the law” in
keeping with the “tripartite form of our democracy.”30 It was
directly aimed at restraining the growing power of
administrative agencies in America’s governmental structure
because the potential for abuse of that power was palpable.31
Prior to the enactment of the APA, President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt’s Committee on Administrative Management
described administrative agencies as “miniature independent
governments set up to deal with [various problems],” stating
that they “constitute a headless ‘fourth branch’ of the
Government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and
uncoordinated powers.”32 In essence, they are a fusion of
legislative, executive, and judicial powers.33 In supporting the
25

JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938), reprinted in SCHUCK,
supra note 21, at 14.
26
Id. at 16.
27
See ROBERT RABIN, FEDERAL REGULATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
(1986), reprinted in SCHUCK, supra note 21, at 41.
28
See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
29
RABIN, supra note 27, at 41.
30
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79th CONG., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: 1944-46, at III (1946) [hereinafter APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
31
Id. at 350 (Statesman Elihu Root said, “Yet the powers that are committed
to these regulating agencies, and which they must have to do their work, carry with
them great and dangerous opportunities of oppression and wrong. If we are to continue
a government of limited powers these agencies of regulation must themselves be
regulated.”).
32
Id. at 189 (quoting Report of President’s Committee on Administrative
Management).
33
See STEVEN J. CANN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 8 (4th ed. 2006) (“In the modern,
complex, postindustrial world, policies are initiated, formulated, promulgated, and
modified by technocratic experts who hold mid- to high-level positions in America’s
bureaucracies (federal, state, and local). The same agencies that make the policies also
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passage of the Administrative Procedure Act to put a check on
agency action, President Roosevelt cautioned that “[t]he
practice of creating independent regulatory commissions, who
perform administrative work in addition to judicial work,
threatens to develop a ‘fourth branch’ of the Government for
which there is no sanction in the Constitution.”34 The
President’s Committee on Administrative Management added
in its report that this “not only undermines judicial fairness; it
weakens public confidence in that fairness.”35
As pointed out by Representative Francis E. Walter of
Pennsylvania, who was a member of the House of
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary during the
enactment of the APA, “[administrative law] is administrative
because it involves the exercise of legislative and judicial powers
of government by officers who are neither legislators nor judges.
It is law because what they do is binding upon the citizens
exactly as statutes or judgments are binding.”36 In the traditional
form of American government, the three interdependent
branches take on separate roles, and each branch is monitored
by the other branches through the system of checks and
balances.37 Since agencies cannot be monitored in this way, it
was essential that an alternate means of control be created.38
Representative Walter explained that federal agencies
engage in three different functions: legislative, judicial, and
investigative.39 In order to put a check on those functions, the
Act employs three different devices: public information,
administrative operation, and judicial review.40 Most relevant
implement them. Pursuant to implementing their own policies, agencies also investigate
infractions of those policies and adjudicate those infractions. The agencies also impose
sanctions. Although there may be academic squabbles over the degree of power that
bureaucracies have acquired, there is virtually no disagreement over the fact that the old
dichotomy between policy making and policy implementation is gone and that
administrative agencies now perform both functions, fused into one institution.”).
34
APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 189.
35
Id. (quoting Report of President’s Committee on Administrative Management).
36
Id. at 349.
37
Checks and Balances, AMERICA.GOV (Jan. 3, 2008), http://www.america.
gov/st/usg-english/2008/January/20071116173344eaifas0.9917719.html.
38
See Cass Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since
1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 271 (1986) (“In attempting to control administrative
processes, the drafters of the APA responded to two quite general constitutional
themes . . . . The first concerns the usurpation of government by powerful private
groups. The second involves the danger of self-interested representation: the pursuit by
political actors of interests that diverge from those of the citizenry.”).
39
APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 352-53.
40
See id. at 353. The APA’s public information section requires that agencies
disclose information about their organizational structure and procedures, as well as
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to this note is the legislative function of federal agencies, as
concerned with the IRS’s rulemaking procedures.
B.

Relevant Provisions of the APA

By means of introduction, Section 551(1) of the APA
defines “agency” as “each authority of the Government of the
United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review
by another agency,” and also provides exceptions, none of
which include the IRS.41 The term “rule” is defined under
Section 551(4) as “the whole or any part of any agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future
effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy or to describe the organization, procedure, or practice
requirements of any agency . . . .”42 A pronouncement is a rule
“to the extent that . . . [it] formally prescribe[s] a course of
conduct for the future rather than merely pronounce[s] existing
rights or liabilities.”43 Thus, “[a]gencies are given discretion to
dispense with notice (and consequently with public
proceedings) in the case of interpretive rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure,
or practice”44—all of which do not impose new “courses of
conduct for the future.”
Once it is established that an agency is subject to APA
rulemaking requirements, the Act prescribes in Section 553
procedures for promulgating rules.45 These procedures

make public “substantive and interpretive rules which they have framed for the
guidance of the public.” Id. The sections that deal with administrative operations
require that agencies submit notices of proposed regulations and allow interested
parties to submit comments in lieu of the traditional congressional hearing that would
otherwise be held during the legislative process. Id. Those sections also outline the
procedures for agency hearings and adjudications, and the limitations upon “penalties
or relief which agencies may impose or confer in any case.” Id. at 354. Finally, the
judicial review section “prescribes . . . when there may be judicial review and how far
the courts may go in examining into a given case.” Id.
41
5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2006); see also APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
30, at 1, 354.
42
5 U.S.C. § 551(4).
43
APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 197.
44
Id. at 200; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
45
See CANN, supra note 33, at 293. Only substantive rules must go through
the Section 553 rulemaking process, even though there are three types of rules:
interpretive, procedural, and substantive. Id. at 294. However, all rules must be
published in the Federal Register once adopted. Id. at 294-95.
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“encourage public participation in the rulemaking process.”46
They do this by requiring agencies to issue public notices of
proposed regulations, collect public comments, and take those
comments into consideration when finalizing the regulation.47
The general procedures are as follows: Section 553(b)
requires an agency to publish in the Federal Register a public
notice of its proposed rulemaking.48 Next, Section 553(c) provides
that the agency allow the public to submit comments on the
proposed rule.49 Once the agency has collected the public’s
remarks regarding the proposed rule, it takes that input into
consideration and only then writes out the rule. The agency will
also include a “concise general statement of [the rule’s] basis and
purpose,”50 which the courts will use to review the validity of the
rule.51 The rule is then published in the Federal Register again,
and only after thirty days does it become a final rule, binding the
courts and the public.52 Final rules may not be promulgated
without first being publicly proposed.53
However, Section 553(b) provides exceptions to the
notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements of Section 553.54
These exceptions include interpretive rules, procedural rules,
policy statements, and good cause.55 Such items are excluded
from notice-and-comment rulemaking because they do not
dictate the future conduct of individuals, nor do they have the

46

Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s
(Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1728 (2007).
47
Id. at 1732-33.
48
Id. at 1732 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)).
49
Id. at 1733.
50
CANN, supra note 33, at 293 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
51
Hickman, supra note 46, at 1733.
52
CANN, supra note 33, at 293.
53
Hickman, supra note 46, at 1732 (“[T]he courts generally do not allow
agencies to promulgate final rules with provisions not ‘sufficiently foreshadowed’ by an
NPRM.”). See id. at n.20 for cases and a treatise that discuss the “sufficiently
foreshadowed” test.
54
Id. at 1734.
55
Id. Although these exceptions are available, all rules are still subject to
publication and are open to challenge. Procedural and interpretive rules must be
published in the Federal Register as soon as they are adopted. CANN, supra note 33, at
294-95. Additionally, interested parties adversely affected by an interpretive rule have
the opportunity to challenge the rule in an adjudicatory hearing before suffering the
effects of that rule. Id. at 298.
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effect of law.56 As discussed below, the IRS has used these
exceptions to keep from complying with the APA.57
II.

THE IRS

The IRS assumes one of the greatest roles in our
government: collecting revenue.58 Such revenue is used to
finance various governmental functions necessary to protect
and help run the country.59 The IRS is in turn given great
powers to fulfill this role.60 As discussed in Part II.A, the IRS
assumes executive, legislative, and judicial powers in making
sure that the government receives from taxpayers the tax
revenue to which it is entitled. The IRS’s primary focus is thus
on the taxpayer. However, despite having such great powers
and dealing directly with citizens, the IRS has failed to adhere
to the APA, which was enacted to avoid this exact situation:
the accumulation of power in one agency, threatening to
overlook the interests of the people.61 Part II.A gives a brief
description of the IRS, along with its current mission, and Part
II.B explains the IRS’s lack of compliance with the APA.
A.

In General

The IRS had its beginnings in 1862 when President
Abraham Lincoln appointed a Commissioner of Internal Revenue
to collect income taxes to help finance the civil war.62 This tax was
repealed ten years later, and when Congress tried to reenact it in
1894, the Supreme Court struck it down as unconstitutional.63 It
was not until the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913
that the power to collect income taxes was finally approved.64
Today, personal income taxes generate almost half of the total

56

See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.B.
58
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
59
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
60
See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
61
See supra Part I.B.
62
Brief History of IRS, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=149200,00.html
(last updated Nov. 1, 2007).
63
Id.
64
Id.
57
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federal revenue.65 Thus, the current focus of the IRS is
predominantly on individual taxpayers.
In exercising its power to collect taxes, the IRS assumes
the roles of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.66 It
does this by executing the same laws and policies it
promulgates.67 Then, in implementing its formulated rules, the
IRS scrutinizes taxpayers’ filings when it suspects violations of
those rules, and imposes sanctions accordingly.68
In keeping with its focus on taxpayers, the current
mission of the IRS is as follows: “Provide America’s taxpayers
top-quality service by helping them understand and meet their
tax responsibilities and enforce the law with integrity and
fairness to all.”69 Based upon its mission statement, it is clear
that the IRS wants to assist taxpayers and treat them fairly.
However, although the IRS strives to be more taxpayer
friendly, the tax code remains highly complex, which instead
burdens taxpayers.70 There are many regulations, rulings,
notices, and other pronouncements that contribute to rule
complexity and inequity, making the system inefficient and in
dire need of reform.71 In addition to, and more likely as a result
of, this complexity and inequity, public opinion of the agency
remains low.72
B.

The IRS’s Lack of Compliance with the APA

In a study on the extent of the Treasury’s compliance
with the APA, Professor Kristin E. Hickman found that the
Treasury has failed to follow the rulemaking requirements of
the APA in 40.9% of the total strategically chosen rulemaking
projects—spanning three years—that she studied.73 She also
found that in almost 90% of those nonconforming rules, or
36.2% of all of the projects studied, the “Treasury instead
issued legally-binding temporary regulations simultaneously
65

U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2005 TO 2014, at 72 (2004), available at http://www.
cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4985/01-26-BudgetOutlook-EntireReport.pdf.
66
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
67
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
68
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
69
IRS Mission Statement and LMSB Vision Statement, IRS.GOV, http://www.
irs.gov/businesses/article/0,,id=181225,00.html (last updated June 23, 2010).
70
See Edwards, supra note 2.
71
See id.
72
Boully, supra note 3.
73
Hickman, supra note 46, at 1748.
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with the [notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)], requesting
public comments on the temporary regulations as proposed
regulations also.”74 This rulemaking process is backwards and
defeats the purpose of the APA, which is to allow commenting
and to protect affected parties before a rule becomes binding.75
She explains that “[t]he typical pattern of these projects
involves Treasury collecting public comments and evaluating
them in promulgating the final regulations some months or
years after issuing the NPRM.”76 The remaining nonconforming
rules were issued as final regulations without notice-andcomment altogether.77
To defend its actions, the Treasury argues that
interpretive rules are exempt from the provisions of Section
553(b), (c), and (d), and then posits that most Treasury
regulations fall under this interpretative rule exception, among
others.78 However, Professor Hickman concludes in her study
that the “Treasury’s reliance on the interpretive rule,
procedural rule, and good cause exemptions of APA section
553(b) is misplaced.”79
In general, the interpretive rule exception is
questionable because “all Treasury regulations are legislative
rules,” whether promulgated under specific authority or
general authority.80 It used to be that regulations promulgated
under general authority did not have the force of law and were
unequivocally considered to be interpretive, merely explaining
the meaning of a statute.81 However, that is no longer the case,
as both general and specific authority regulations carry the

74

Id.
See supra Parts I.A-B.
76
Hickman, supra note 46, at 1748-49.
77
Id. at 1749.
78
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.1.4.4 (2004), available at http://www.
irs.gov/irm. It is important to note here that although the IRS claims that it is exempt
from the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures of the APA, it nonetheless
conforms to such procedures more often than not. Professor Hickman found that the
IRS followed the traditional APA rulemaking process in 59.1% of the projects studied.
Hickman, supra note 46, at 1749 tbl. 1. However, in almost all of the projects studied—
92.70%—Professor Hickman found that the “Treasury claimed explicitly that the
rulemaking requirements of APA section 553(b) did not apply.” Id. at 1749. And, in
81.55% of the total, the Treasury did not provide any reason or “basis” for making such
a “conclusory statement.” Id.
79
Hickman, supra note 46, at 1759.
80
Id. at 1773.
81
Id.
75
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force of law by affecting people’s rights and obligations,82 thus
making them legislative rules by definition.83 As a result,
subjecting all, or at least most, regulations to notice-andcomment rulemaking would be in line with the essential
purpose of the APA, which is to allow taxpayers to place a
check on an agency that has the potential to abuse its power by
promulgating binding rules that it simultaneously enforces.84 It
would be absurd to think that Congress intended to exempt
rules that altered people’s rights and obligations from
complying with the APA. The rules that the IRS claims are
interpretive are in fact legislative because they affect people’s
rights and obligations. Accordingly, such rules should be
subject to APA notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures to
ensure people’s rights are not exploited.
Likewise, the use of the procedural rule exception is
questionable because the temporary regulations the IRS
claimed were procedural rules actually “elaborated substantive
provisions of the [Internal Revenue Code] in substantive ways”
rather than “merely tweak the way that taxpayers interact
with the government.”85 As discussed in the preceding
paragraph, any rule that treads on people’s rights and
obligations must be subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures to ensure that the IRS is not overstepping its
boundaries and is treating people fairly. The IRS should not be
allowed to claim exceptions for something that does not fit the
definition of what qualifies for such exception. The IRS, of all
agencies, should be very familiar with how narrowly exceptions
should be applied.86
And finally, the good cause exception is misplaced. First,
it fails on procedural grounds because the APA requires that if
an agency wants to invoke the good cause exception, it must do
so expressly and “provide ‘a brief statement of reasons’ along
with the regulations being issued.”87 Second, the good cause
82

Id.; see also Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory
Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 393-401 (noting the declining relevance of the specific
versus general authority distinction).
83
See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
84
See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
85
Hickman, supra note 46, at 1777-78.
86
When taxpayers claim exemptions on their tax returns, such exemptions
must adhere to strict definitions set forth by the IRS. Narrow applications of such
exemptions are in the IRS’s best interests because it wants to allow as few people and
organizations as possible to not pay taxes.
87
Hickman, supra note 46, at 1778 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2006)).
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exception fails on substantive grounds because it is a narrow
provision meant to provide agencies with “flexibility in dealing
with emergencies and typographical errors, plus the occasional
situation in which advance notice would be counterproductive.”88
In her study, Professor Hickman found that the Treasury did not
have a valid purpose for invoking this narrow exception, or at
least that its purposes were questionable.89
Surely it is more convenient for the IRS to bypass the
APA’s procedural hurdles. There may even be an argument in
favor of noncompliance because it allows the Treasury to keep
up with social and economic events that may be corrected
through the tax system. However, if we want to maintain the
integrity of our democratic system of government and protect
taxpayers’ rights, we must subject the IRS to scrutiny through
notice-and-comment rulemaking.
III.

WHY THE IRS SHOULD ADHERE TO THE APA

In addition to the doctrinal flaws in the Treasury’s use
of the exemptions to Section 553(b), there are more practical
reasons that warrant the IRS’s compliance with the APA’s
rulemaking requirements. By complying with the APA, the IRS
could protect itself against courts striking down its rules for
failure to adhere to notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures. This is especially important in the face of a recent
circuit court decision that might have opened the door to
judicial review of preenforcement agency action. Additionally,
the IRS could ensure that the rules are given the utmost
deference in litigation proceedings involving those rules.
Furthermore, adhering to the APA would increase taxpayer
confidence in the system, and would in turn help the IRS
accomplish its goal of reducing the tax gap. And finally,
engaging the IRS in the notice-and-comment rulemaking
process would uphold the integrity of the law, along with the
fundamental principles of separation of powers.

88
89

Id. at 1782-86.
Id.
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Judicial Review
1. Cohen v. United States and Judicial Review of
Preenforcement Agency Action

Cohen v. United States was initiated when “various
[multidistrict litigation] lawsuits arose challenging the refund
process” for “[excise] taxes erroneously collected between
February 28, 2003 and August 1, 2006.”90 The refund process was
announced in Notice 2006-5091 (“the Notice”) after five circuit
courts ruled that the tax was invalid.92 The United States
District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the cases,
holding that the appellants “failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies for their refund claims and failed to
state valid claims under federal law, including the APA.”93 The
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the dismissal of
appellants’s APA claims, and affirmed the dismissal of Cohen’s
refund claim.94
Generally, when it comes to tax cases, the D.C. Circuit
has limited jurisdiction:95 it may hear cases involving disputed
funds only after the petitioner has exhausted the refund
procedures found in the tax code.96 Otherwise, a party must
90

Cohen v. United States, 578 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Pursuant to 26
U.S.C. § 4252(b), the IRS collects a three percent excise tax on long-distance phone
calls whose charges “vary with distance and transmission time.” Id. at 3. However,
when the IRS continued to collect these taxes despite a shift in the telecommunications
industry practice that led to “many consumers . . . pay[ing] strictly based on
transmission time” and without reference to distance, taxpayers challenged the tax. Id.
Five circuit courts sided with the taxpayers and held the tax “inapplicable to longdistance calls charged without reference to the distance variable.” Id. at 4.
91
I.R.S. Notice 2006-50, 2006-1 C.B. 1141.
92
Cohen, 578 F.3d at 4.
93
Id.
94
Id. A rehearing en banc had been scheduled for September 29, 2010. Cohen
v. United States, 599 F.3d 652, 652 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam). As of the date of this
note, the D.C. Circuit had not released an opinion.
95
Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may only hear “cases
or controversies involving conflicts that may arise under either the Constitution or
laws of the federal government.” CANN, supra note 33, at 115. However, Congress may
allow federal courts appellate jurisdiction, meaning that the courts may review the
decisions of some lower courts absent a constitutional or federal issue. Id. at 128.
96
Cohen, 578 F.3d at 6; see also 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
This is called a postenforcement or “enforcement-based” action, meaning that
the rule has been applied, it adversely affected a party, and that party wants to challenge
the application of the rule rather than the general “substantive or procedural validity of a
regulation.” Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of)
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1153, 1164 n.46 (2008). Generally, there are two types of post-enforcement actions:
(1) “refund litigation” where the taxpayer was assessed a deficiency, paid it over to the IRS,
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have been “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute.”97 The circuit court
viewed Cohen v. United States as that extraordinary tax case
that fell under its federal question jurisdiction.98
The issue in the case was the classification of the Notice
issued by the IRS: whether it was a “substantive rule” or a
“general statement of policy.”99 As mentioned above, the Notice set
forth procedures for claiming a refund for the improperly collected
excise taxes.100 The court, refusing to accept the IRS’s position that
this Notice was a general statement of policy and thus not subject
to APA challenges, held that the Notice was indeed subject to
challenges under the APA.101 It found that the Notice “constituted
a final agency action that aggrieved taxpayers by hindering their
access to court” and remanded the case for further consideration
under the appellants’ APA claims.102
In reaching its holding, the court reasoned that under the
APA, “[a] substantive rule constitutes a binding final agency
action and is reviewable,”103 whereas a general policy statement
is not.104 It applied a two-prong test for determining whether a
rule is binding and thus reviewable.105 That test looks to whether
the rule “(1) marked the ‘consummation’ of the IRS’s decisionmaking process and (2) either affects legal ‘rights or obligations’
or results in ‘legal consequences.’”106 The court found that the
Notice at issue met the test because it “operates as a substantive
rule that binds the IRS, excise tax collectors, and taxpayers,”107
and it is thus subject to scrutiny under the APA.
This is the first time the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit has directly scrutinized the substantive and procedural
aspects of an agency action without a tax refund claim pending

and is seeking a refund; and (2) “deficiency litigation” where a deficiency has been assessed,
is due, but has not yet been paid over to the IRS. Id. at 1164.
97
5 U.S.C. § 702.
98
Cohen, 578 F.3d at 6 (“[O]nly in the anomalous case where the wrongful
assessment is not disputed and litigants do not seek a refund is a standalone claim
under the APA viable. This is that case.”). See id. at 5.
99
Id. at 7.
100
See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
101
Cohen, 578 F.3d at 12.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 6.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997)).
107
Id.
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in the forefront of that action.108 The IRS should heed this
decision because, historically, other circuits have followed the
D.C. Circuit when it comes to administrative law issues.109
Notably, the fact that the court did not find the IRS’s
characterization of the Notice dispositive should speak volumes
to the IRS.110 It seems that the court will apply its own
independent test in determining whether an agency action is
substantive or whether it is merely interpretive, regardless of
how the IRS characterizes it.
Perhaps the IRS will choose to limit this case to its facts
and refuse to follow it; but the fact remains that the D.C.
Circuit has opened the door for judicial scrutiny of IRS action
under the APA without an underlying tax dispute. Likewise,
even if this holding is vacated upon a rehearing en banc, it is
important because it shows the D.C. Circuit’s willingness to
rule in this manner, and other circuits can still look to the
vacated ruling for guidance.111 Additionally, the law still stands
that if an agency action is found to be a substantive rather
than merely interpretive rule, it will be subject to judicial
review under the APA. Consequently, the Cohen decision
demonstrates the court’s potential willingness to engage in
independent analysis of the IRS’s actions without deferring to
the agency’s characterization of its actions as determinative,
and its willingness to do so without a tax refund claim pending
in the forefront of the action.
Although the court made clear that “this is a postenforcement case,”112 it nevertheless hinted that there is
nothing in the case law to preclude courts from scrutinizing a
108

The court ruled that the refund claim had not ripened at the time of the
suit, and so the district court did not err by dismissing the refund claim. Id. at 22. The
courts of appeals generally review the validity of IRS rules only when there is an
appeal of a tax dispute. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
109
Paul L. Caron, Hickman: D.C. Circuit Delivers a Doozy, TAX PROF BLOG (Aug.
8, 2009), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2009/08/hickman-dc-circuit.html.
110
See John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893,
893 (2004) (“If a purported nonlegislative rule has operative characteristics that only a
legislative rule can legitimately possess, courts will not hesitate to invalidate that rule
on the ground that the agency did not use proper procedures to adopt it.”).
111
The rehearing was scheduled on the following issues: (1) Whether the
Administrative Procedure Act claims of the plaintiffs are barred at this time under 28
U.S.C. § 2201(a) or 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a); (2) Should D.C. Circuit precedent interpreting
the Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act as “coterminous” be
overruled? (3) If the Anti-Injunction Act or the Declaratory Judgment Act bars the
court from hearing plaintiffs’ APA claims, may plaintiffs still challenge IRS Notice
2006-50 in a refund suit under 26 U.S.C. § 7422? (4) Does APA Section 702 waive
sovereign immunity for plaintiffs’ APA claims? Cohen, 599 F.3d at 652.
112
Cohen, 578 F.3d at 13.
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preenforcement action: “the dissent similarly cannot point to
any case that has disallowed a pre-enforcement APA challenge
in a context like this one.”113 The court even asserted that “[n]o
agency operates beyond the reach of the law,”114 and made clear
that “[o]nce the limits of the protections Congress provided
have been surpassed, . . . the IRS is subject to the same legal
requirements as other administrative agencies.”115
In sum, the D.C. Circuit refused to accept the IRS’s
characterization of the ruling as a general “policy statement”
and engaged in its own analysis of whether the rule was
interpretive or legislative.116 This shows that courts will take it
upon themselves to review agency action and determine
whether such an action is subject to the APA. And more
importantly, because members of the court, albeit in dissent,
pointed out that there is an argument that Cohen is in fact a
preenforcement action,117 it leaves open the chance for such
independent judicial scrutiny of preenforcement actions under
the APA. The following section explains why such a reading of
the case is plausible.
2. Policy Reasons for Reading Cohen Broadly to Allow for
Judicial Review of Preenforcement Agency Action
There are valid policy reasons for reading Cohen broadly
and thus implementing preenforcement judicial review of IRS
action. For one, preenforcement judicial review would
discourage the IRS from promulgating rules without complying
with the APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements
by making it clear that all rules and regulations will be subject
to challenges under the APA whether or not they have been
enforced. In other words, rules will be subject to judicial review
immediately after promulgation rather than post-enforcement.
This will ensure across-the-board compliance with the APA.
113

Id. The dissent relied on the characterization of the case as a
preenforcement action, opining that the ripeness doctrine precluded the court from
hearing the case at that time. Id. at 21 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in part).
114
Id. at 14 (majority opinion).
115
Id. (referring to the protections Congress afforded to relieve the IRS from
some, albeit not all, of the requirements of the APA).
116
Id. at 8.
117
Id. at 21 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in part) (“Until plaintiffs seek a larger
refund from the IRS and are denied, Notice 2006-50 will not have been enforced
against them by the IRS. So this lawsuit is a pre-enforcement suit targeting Notice
2006-50. And the ripeness doctrine, in my judgment, precludes hearing this preenforcement case at this time.”).
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Similarly, as in Cohen, the mere possibility that a court could
invalidate a regulation for putting unreasonable restrictions or
burdens on taxpayers in redeeming refunds might encourage
the IRS to make sure there are no such hurdles at the outset.
In addition to deterring the IRS from abusing its power,
allowing for preenforcement judicial review would foster the
type of balance that exists between the branches of
government. Because administrative agencies have been
deemed the “fourth branch” of government,118 it is appropriate
to subject them to the same regulatory scheme employed by the
original three branches in which each one is subject to some
sort of “check” by the others.119 This judicial “check” on the IRS
would ultimately bring about a more democratic legislative
process, as the agency is essentially doing the job of Congress
in promulgating binding law that affects the rights and
obligations of citizens.120 As one scholar points out, “there has
always been in our traditions particular concern with the
judicial role where governmental interference with the ‘private
rights’ of ‘liberty’ and ‘property’ was involved.”121 In terms of the
role of judicial review in the modern administrative state,
“[Justice] Brandeis . . . asserted that ‘[t]he supremacy of law
demands that there shall be an opportunity to have some court
decide whether an erroneous rule was applied.’”122
Although
Congress
has
implemented
various
exemptions to the IRS’s compliance with various regulatory
schemes that stand in the way of judicial review,123 Cohen and
the underlying principles that would support preenforcement
judicial review of agency action suggest that a shift to greater
and more aggressive judicial review of IRS rule-making
procedures might be imminent. As such, it is in the best
interest of the IRS to begin complying with the APA across the
board as soon as possible to ensure that its rules will be safe
from APA challenges in the future. By continuing its practice of
noncompliance, coupled with questionable explanations for

118

See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
120
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
121
Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 17 (1983).
122
Id. at 19 (citing St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38,
84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)) (alteration in original).
123
See Hickman, supra note 96, at 1162-81 (describing the limitations on
preenforcement judicial review).
119
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exemption,124 the IRS is digging a deeper hole for itself because
the more rules and regulations it promulgates improperly, the
harder it will be to clean up the mess once the courts take on
preenforcement challenges against such improperly enacted
rules and regulations.
B.

Guarantee Courts’ Deference in Litigation Proceedings

In addition to guarding itself against preenforcement
judicial review by complying with the APA’s notice-andcomment rulemaking requirements, compliance with the APA
will help the IRS become more efficient by guaranteeing that
judges will defer to its rules and regulations.125 Achieving such
deference would reduce the time and effort it takes to defend
the validity of the IRS’s rules and regulations once a case has
gone to litigation.126
The state of the law in terms of judicial deference to tax
regulations, and agency rules in general, is unclear.127 The
reason for this uncertainty lies in the ever-debated
legislative/interpretive dichotomy. Traditionally, if a rule was
legislative, courts honored the agency’s position “unless it was
in conflict with the statute, or was arbitrary and capricious.”128
But if the rule was interpretive, courts were free to adopt their
own interpretation of the statute, giving the rule only
“respectful consideration.”129 However, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. required courts to
defer to agency action if they find that that action was

124

See supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 139-45 and accompanying text.
126
For the fiscal year 2009, the IRS chief counsel received 34,478 tax litigation
cases, closed 35,520 tax litigation cases, and had 32,421 tax litigation cases pending as of
September 30, 2009. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 61
(2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/09databk.pdf. The total amount of
operating costs incurred by the IRS in 2009 was $11.7 billion. Id. at 66. Of that total, $4.8
billion was incurred for enforcement activities. Id. at 65. Moreover, because the issue of what
principles will be used to decide whether deference is owed to IRS regulations has not yet been
established, the IRS must continue to expend great effort to prove that a regulation should be
deferred to. See Alan Horowitz, Supreme Court to Address Deference Owed to Regulation
Governing FICA Taxation of Medical Residents, TAX APPELLATE BLOG (Aug. 2, 2010),
http://appellatetax.com/2010/08/02/supreme-court-to-address-deference-owed-to-regulationgoverning-fica-taxation-of-medical-residents.
127
Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in
Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1538 (2006).
128
John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of Treasury
Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 44 (2003).
129
Id. at 45.
125
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reasonable,130 regardless whether the rule was deemed
legislative or interpretive.131 Nevertheless, as will be discussed,
two other cases, and possibly even a third, have muddied the
waters. Therefore, it is advisable for the IRS to take a
conservative approach to its rulemaking authority by ensuring
that all potentially legislative rules comply with the APA.
The Chevron standard is very broad: it “requires
accepting all reasonable agency positions, as opposed to giving
more or less weight to the agency’s position in the course of
deciding what is the best interpretation of the statute.”132
Demonstrably, the Supreme Court has applied Chevron
deference to legislative and interpretive rules alike,133 straying
from the traditional legislative/interpretive dichotomy.
However, in 2000 and 2001 respectively, two Supreme
Court cases—Christensen v. Harris County134 and United States
v. Mead Corp.135—reined in the broad reach of the Chevron
standard. In 2000, Christensen held that “[i]nterpretations
such as those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained
in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant
Chevron-style deference.”136 It fell short, however, in fully
defining the limits of Chevron deference because it did not
specify how a court would go about determining whether a rule
has the force of law.137 It was not until the following year that
the Supreme Court in Mead took on the task of defining
Chevron’s scope.
In limiting Chevron’s applicability, Mead first rejected
the presumption in Chevron that every rule promulgated by an
agency by virtue of its policymaking authority is entitled to
deference as long as it is reasonable.138 Instead, the Court
looked to the intent of Congress to determine whether to grant
Chevron deference.139 To demonstrate that intent, the Court set
130

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984).
See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
132
Coverdale, supra note 128, at 45.
133
Id. at 46 (stating that although most of the regulations deferred to by the
Supreme Court were issued pursuant to notice-and-comment requirements, “the Court
applied Chevron to a broad range of agency positions that had not been subject to
notice and comment”).
134
529 U.S. 576 (2000).
135
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
136
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
137
See id. at 587-88.
138
Coverdale, supra note 128, at 49.
139
Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
131
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out two conditions that must be met: (1) “Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law,” and (2) “the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”140
In setting out those two conditions, “Mead presumes
that when an agency pronouncement is to have [the force of
law], Congress wants to insure ‘fairness and deliberation’
which ‘relatively formal administrative procedure[s] tend[] to
foster.’”141 And, although the Court urged that a lack of noticeand-comment rulemaking is not dispositive of the issue,142 the
Court’s failure to suggest “indicators”—other than notice-andcomment rulemaking or formal adjudication—that show that
the agency is acting pursuant to Congress’s grant of authority
in promulgating its rules suggests otherwise.143 Thus, noticeand-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication are
important indicators that a rule was promulgated under the
authority to give such rule the force of law, thereby entitling it
to Chevron deference.144
Moreover, making formal adjudication or notice-andcomment rulemaking one of the conditions of awarding
Chevron deference to agency pronouncements would be a
clearer standard and would yield the same results as the Mead
court’s test.145 It must be recognized that the reason why the
court did not make notice-and-comment rulemaking the only
requirement for applying Chevron deference was probably
because “[m]aking notice and comment a requirement for
inferring that Congress intends Chevron deference would . . .
have required the Court to overrule a number of its earlier
cases.”146 Nevertheless, judging from the Court’s loose
application of the Mead test to the facts of that case, and its
inability to cite alternative examples that would indicate that
Congress granted the agency authority to promulgate binding
rules, “although unwilling to say so, the Court considers noticeand-comment rulemaking or adjudication virtually the sin qua
non of Chevron deference.”147
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

Id.
Coverdale, supra note 128, at 50 (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 230).
Mead, 533 U.S. at 231.
Coverdale, supra note 128, at 51, 54; see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31.
Coverdale, supra note 128, at 51.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id.
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Given this reading of Mead, it is in the IRS’s best
interest
to
fully
comply
with
notice-and-comment
requirements. Unless the Supreme Court is going to completely
defer to any reasonable agency action, it is going to look to the
agency’s delegated authority and the formal administrative
procedures used in exercising that authority to determine
whether or not the agency’s actions have infringed on the
democratic legislative process.148 And from the Mead opinion, it
is evident that notice-and-comment rulemaking is the most
concrete indication that Congress granted the agency the
authority to promulgate rules carrying the force of law.
Additionally, in 2008 the Third Circuit in Swallows
Holding, Ltd. v. Commissioner149 “provide[d] an unsettling
reminder of the confusing state of the law concerning when
courts should defer to federal tax regulations,”150 and further
confirmed the importance of notice-and-comment rulemaking
requirements. There, the court reversed the Tax Court and
upheld the validity of a Treasury regulation that was deemed
to be interpretive by the Tax Court.151 In reaching its decision,
the Third Circuit applied Chevron deference without drawing a
distinction between the legislative or interpretive nature of the
regulations.152 Instead, it found that Chevron deference was
applicable because the regulation was opened to public
comment—“a move that is indicative of agency action that
carries the force of law.”153
In utilizing notice-and-comment rulemaking as its basis
for deference, the circuit court “set[] the stage for the level of
judicial deference to be decided based on whether the IRS
complies with the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act.”154 This, however, raises the issue of what level
of deference will be given to regulations that are purported to
carry the force of law but were not promulgated under the
formal rulemaking requirements of the APA.155
148

Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-30.
515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008).
150
Eve Elgin, Swallows Decision Renews Questions About Judicial Deference to
Tax Regs, THE TAX ADVISOR, June 1, 2008, available at http://www.aicpa.org/Publications/
TaxAdviser/2008/jun/Pages/SwallowsDecisionRenewsQuestionsAboutJudicialDeferenceto
TaxRegs.aspx?.
151
Swallows Holding, 515 F.3d at 164.
152
Id. at 169.
153
Id. at 169-70.
154
Elgin, supra note 150.
155
Id.
149
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In sum, it is unclear whether legislative regulations will
receive Chevron deference while interpretive regulations will
not. Nor is it clear that notice-and-comment rulemaking is the
sole indicator of an action that carries the force of law. What is
clear is that, either way, it is best for the IRS to move away
from its characterization of regulations and rulings as
interpretive and to begin complying with the APA across the
board. Even if courts do not base their decisions on the
legislative/interpretive dichotomy, which would favor the IRS’s
position by allowing interpretive regulations to receive
deference, courts will nonetheless place great emphasis on
whether the rule was promulgated using the APA’s notice-andcomment requirements. And since many rules promulgated by
the IRS fail to conform to APA rulemaking requirements,156 it
leaves these rules open to challenges, meaning that the IRS
will need to expend extra resources to prove to courts that their
rules and regulations are valid. Consequently, if the IRS
continues its noncompliance with the APA, it will delay
litigation by taking the focus off the merits of the case, increase
the agency’s litigation costs, and ultimately undercut the
efficiency of its enforcement procedures.
C.

Increase Taxpayer Confidence and Help Close the Tax Gap

Because the majority of tax revenue is generated by the
individual income tax, the IRS’s focus has shifted to the
taxpayer.157 Its current mission to support and protect
taxpayers in the taxing process evidences this fact.158
Additionally, the IRS has not lost sight of its primary goal:
collection of every dollar of tax revenue it is entitled to under
the law.159 Thus, in addition to its mission, the IRS has put
forth goals for reducing the tax gap, which is a problem that
has created a deficiency of approximately $290 billion in
expected revenues.160 The tax gap consists of underreporting,
underpayment, and nonfiling.161 Underreporting makes up over
fifty percent of the total tax gap. And, more importantly, the
156

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.A.
158
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
159
See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
160
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UPDATE ON REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP AND
IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 2 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
newsroom/tax_gap_report_-final_version.pdf.
161
Id. at 2-3.
157
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individual income tax is the “single largest sub-component of
underreporting.”162 Consequently, the report places great
emphasis on taxpayer assistance as well: “The Administration
recognizes the particular value of those efforts and initiatives
that improve voluntary compliance by making the tax filing
process easier and more taxpayer-friendly,” which is also in
line with the overall mission of the IRS.163
In setting forth this key goal, the IRS conceded the
complexity of the tax code, and reiterated the fact that
“effective taxpayer assistance is necessary to help taxpayers
understand and comply with their obligations.”164 Moreover, the
IRS emphasized the importance of “simple, clear
communication” to make compliance easier for taxpayers.165
Certainly, the issuance of various guiding documents such as
regulations, revenue rulings, and notices—some binding, some
not—does not help promote simplicity, since it is unlikely that
the average taxpayer would have the time and resources to
understand the documents and how they apply. This
strengthens the case for full compliance with the APA, which
would allow a clear distinction to be made between the various
guidance documents that are binding and carry the force of
law, and those that are not and are hence merely interpretive.
Part of the IRS’s current plan in reforming and
simplifying the tax law is working with Congress “to enact
simplification legislative provisions.”166 Certainly, this will help
alleviate the confusion created by the various interpretive
regulations and rulings; but quite frankly, it will take a long
time to reenact every obscure tax law since Congress’s capacity
to enact laws greatly trails that of federal agencies.167
Admittedly, it would be ideal for Congress to enact any
potential simplification legislation, as this would be consistent
with our traditional sense of democracy, in which we elect
representatives to be our voice in creating laws and policies.168
However, living in a postindustrial society, as we do today,
where there are more problems to deal with and where those
162

Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
164
Id. at 21.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 25.
167
Congress has averaged 288 public laws per year from 1975 to 1996, while
administrative agencies approve nearly 4000 per year. CANN, supra note 33, at 19.
168
Id. at 7.
163
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problems are increasingly complex,169 it is more efficient to have
an administrative agency like the Department of the Treasury
assume the task of setting policy and ironing out the
ambiguities in the law.170 After all, that is the underlying
reason for the creation of “the administrative state.”171 However,
because such efficiency comes with a price—namely, the
potential for overreaching—agencies should be regulated in
order to maintain fairness and ensure that the simplification
process is democratic.172
Thus, since it will be difficult and time-consuming for
the IRS to simplify its tax laws by working with Congress to
enact simplification legislation, and since the alternative route
is agency rulemaking, which, if unbridled, has much potential
for abuse and overreaching, the IRS should comply with the
APA in lieu of working directly with Congress. Compliance
with the APA will eliminate the inherent problems of a “fourth
branch
of
government”
and
ensure
fairness
and
173
accountability. This will allow the IRS to achieve its goal of
closing the tax gap more efficiently without undermining its
mission of taxpayer assistance and fairness to all.174
D.

Uphold the Integrity of the Rule of Law

Our democratic form of government is predicated upon
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances.
The system of checks and balances was established to place a
check on each branch of government and prevent any one
branch from overpowering the other branches.175
169

Id. at 9 (pointing out that with industrialization came urbanization, which
“exacerbate[d] problems such as poverty, poor housing, poor health, crime, hunger,
malnutrition, sewage disposal, and alienation,” and that limited government “is not an
instrument for dealing with such problems”). Additionally, because of industrialization,
society began to demand that government step in to regulate the economy and people’s
lives because of the idea that “some individuals cannot achieve their fullest potential
without help and that help generally will come from government.” Id. at 10. As a
result, government was called on to regulate things such as child labor, child
education, food, and monopolies, to name just a few. Id.
170
Id. at 10-11.
171
Id. “The administrative state” is an expression used to describe “[t]he
notion of policy making by agencies and bureaucracies rather than by popularly elected
(and accountable) representatives.” Id. at 8. It is also known as “the fourth branch of
government.” Id.
172
See supra Part II.A.
173
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
174
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
175
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Whether the IRS is promulgating a rule or making a
procedural change within the organization itself, public
information is essential to maintaining checks and balances in
our government.176 When the growth of the administrative state
began to threaten this system, Congress decided it was
necessary to employ an external device to place a check on the
agencies.177 This led to the passage of the APA.178
Additionally, because there is no equivalent of a
legislature within the agencies to represent the will of the
people like in Congress, public information and notice-andcomment rulemaking have to take its place.179 As expressed in
the APA’s legislative history, “[t]he public information
requirements . . . are in many ways among the most important,
far-reaching, and useful provisions of the bill.”180 “[They]
require[] that agencies state their organizational set-ups,
promulgate statements respecting their procedures, and make
available as regulations the substantive and interpretive rules
which they have framed for the guidance of the public.”181
The government obtains its power from the people,182
and so it must answer to the public when making laws that
affect their rights and liabilities.183 The people delegated to the
government the power to make choices on their behalf, but only
under the condition that their interests would be protected.184
Thus, when a government agency has no check on its power,
and may assume the role of either the legislative, executive, or
judicial branch without restraint, the people must be informed
and be given an opportunity to express their concerns and
ensure that their interests are being protected.185 Complying
with the APA accomplishes this need and provides for a more
176

APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 198.
See Sunstein, supra note 38, at 271.
178
Id.
179
See Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S.
370, 386 (1932) (emphasizing that when Congress delegates its lawmaking power to an
agency, that agency “speaks as the legislature, and its pronouncement has the force of
a statute”). However, despite assuming the legislature’s role, there are no specially
elected representatives who will represent the will of the people. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
180
APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 198.
181
Id. at 353.
182
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”).
183
See Marci A. Hamilton, Representation and Nondelegation: Back to Basics,
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 809, 814 (1999).
184
Id.
185
See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
177
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legitimate rulemaking process.186 By complying with the APA,
an agency shows respect for the public and demonstrates that
it is concerned with protecting the public’s interests. This
undoubtedly increases people’s confidence in that agency.
Additionally, notice-and-comment rulemaking makes it
more likely that an agency will “apply the law evenhandedly,
rather than engage in ad hoc decisionmaking.”187 By publicizing
a proposed rule and accepting input from the public before
promulgating the final product, the agency ensures that
narrow interests are not favored at the expense of the general
public’s interests, and it also creates consistency in the law.188
Furthermore, if an agency seeks to enact a binding rule that
will have the full force of law, then it must employ procedures
that mirror those of the traditional legislative process.189
IV.

CONCLUSION

The IRS is one of the most powerful agencies in our
government, and it serves one of the most important functions
therein—a function upon which all other functions of government
rely: collection of revenue through taxation. However, with such
great power comes the potential for abuse and overreaching. That
is not to say that the IRS engages in such abuse of power, but the
combination of complexity in the tax code and the IRS’s lack of
compliance with the APA in promulgating rules have contributed
to the IRS’s tarnished image.
With today’s increasing national debt,190 it is even more
critical than before that the IRS operate efficiently and
successfully in collecting all the tax revenue it is entitled to
under the tax laws. Because it is inadvisable to impose new
taxes on individuals during a recession, it is important to use
current tax laws to collect as much money as possible.191
186

Asimow, supra note 82, at 402 (“The APA notice and comment procedure
infuses the rulemaking process with significant elements of openness, accountability,
and legitimacy.”).
187
Manning, supra note 110, at 905.
188
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 539 (2003).
189
Id. (“The law-like decisionmaking requirement ensures that when agencies
claim the force of law, they actually have made law.”).
190
See generally Brian M. Riedl, The Obama Budget: Spending, Taxes, and
Doubling the National Debt, BACKGROUNDER (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.heritage.
org/Research/budget/bg2249.cfm.
191
See id. at 7 (“While there is never a good time to raise taxes, President
Obama’s proposal to raise taxes during a recession is especially problematic.”).
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Consequently, it is important for the IRS to ensure that those
rules it wants to operate with the force of law actually do so, so
as to improve the IRS’s efficiency and lower the costs of
litigation proceedings when rules are challenged. This is
particularly important because of the implications for the IRS
of the recently decided D.C. Circuit case, Cohen v. United
States, and because of the lack of certainty in the law
governing judicial deference to administrative agencies.
By complying with the APA, the IRS will protect itself
against the risk that courts will scrutinize rules
preenforcement rather than postenforcement; ensure deference
in litigation proceedings, thereby creating efficiency and
cutting costs; achieve its goal in reducing the tax gap; and
maintain integrity of the law by supporting a democratic
legislative process, thereby protecting taxpayer interests and
increasing their confidence in the system.
It is not certain that courts will embrace the practice of
reviewing agency actions under the APA without there being a
tax dispute in the forefront of the matter. However, provided
that there is an argument to be made, along with supporting
policy reasons, that Cohen v. United States should be read
expansively to allow for preenforcement judicial review, it is in
the IRS’s best interests to fully comply with the APA in order to
protect itself in the event that courts continue to shift focus.
Additionally, it would be wise for the IRS to begin complying
with the APA as soon as possible so that if courts do decide to go
in the direction of preenforcement judicial review,192 the IRS will
not have to expend money and other resources to go back and
make sure that rules that were not promulgated under noticeand-comment rulemaking procedures adhere to such procedures.
When it comes to the issue of deference the courts give
to agency rules, the only thing that is certain is that the law in
this area is uncertain. From the broad Chevron deference to its
restricting successor cases, courts are not settled upon a clear
standard for determining when to defer to an administrative
rule.193 However, an important development has materialized:
engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking is a good
indication that a rule was promulgated under the authority
from Congress necessary to make the rule operate with the
192

Even if courts do not adopt preenforcement judicial review now, it is likely
that they will sometime in the near future since the APA is such an important check on
agency power, and hence needs to be enforced.
193
See supra Part III.B.
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force of law.194 Thus, the safe bet for the IRS is to comply with
notice-and-comment rulemaking across the board for all rules
it wishes to have the force of law.
Even more important in making the case for the IRS’s
full compliance with the APA is that such compliance will
provide accountability and transparency in the government.
People are generally distrustful of government195—they
condemn the accumulation of too much power in one
organization.196 People want to ensure that their interests are
protected when the government acts.197 Full compliance with
the APA would engage the public in the rulemaking process,
put taxpayers on notice of the potential rules that might bind
them in the future, and give them a voice in the matter to
ensure that those rules are fair and that the IRS is not
overstepping its bounds.
It may be that the IRS does not promulgate all of its
rules using APA rulemaking procedures because the process is
time-consuming and can be costly; however, at the same time,
the value of maintaining a democratic legislative system must
be recognized as well.198 The IRS does not have to promulgate all
194

Agencies obtain their lawmaking powers from Congress. Congress
delegates such authority by passing statutes authorizing agencies to act; thus, in order
for the agency’s rules to carry the force of law, they must comply with those statutes.
See Manning, supra note 110, at 898.
195
PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT: DISTRUST,
DISCONTENT, ANGER AND PARTISAN RANCOR 18 (2010), http://people-press.org/reports/
pdf/606.pdf (showing that the average trust in government has ranged from 22% to
42% since the 1960s without ever reaching the 68% figure it reached during the
Kennedy administration and demonstrating that since that time less than 50% of
people trust the government).
196
Id. at 8 (“The size and power of the federal government also engender
considerable concern. A 52% majority says it is a major problem that the government is
too big and powerful, while 58% say that the federal government is interfering too
much in state and local matters.”).
197
See id. at 43 (“Large majorities across partisan lines see elected officials as
not careful with the government’s money, influenced by special interest money, overly
concerned about their own careers, unwilling to compromise and out of touch with
regular Americans.”).
198
See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference to the United
States, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,101, 30,102 (July 8, 1992) (“The Conference has long advocated
the value of notice and comment in rulemaking, and this recommendation encourages
agencies to use such processes voluntarily in promulgating rules of procedure or
practice. Notice and comment can provide the agency with valuable input from the
public as well as furnish enhanced public acceptance of the rules. On the other hand,
there can be costs to the agency in using notice-and-comment procedures, including the
time and effort of agency personnel, the cost of Federal Register publication, and the
additional delay in implementation that results from seeking public comments and
responding to them. For significant procedural rule changes, the benefits seem likely to
outweigh the costs; but this may not be the case for minor procedural amendments.
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of its rules using notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures,
but it should at least take a more conscious and systematic
approach to promulgating rules that will affect the future
conduct of taxpayers to ensure that the taxpayers’ interests are
protected and that the integrity of the law is upheld.
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Thus, unless the costs outweigh the benefits, we strongly encourage agencies
voluntarily to use notice and comment even where an APA exemption applies.”).
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